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"One cause of the failure of mission work is that most of the missionaries
are entirely ignorant of our history . . . 'what do we care for heathen
records?' . . . and consequently estrange their religion from the habits of

thought we and our forefathers have been accustomed to for centuries
past."'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Differences in the Approach to Forming a Contract
Generally, the Japanese approach to contract formation differs
significantly from the American approach. Indeed, without this difference
many disputes between the countries would not exist. Nevertheless,
presently, the typical American business person says the Japanese
approach to business negotiations wastes time.' Conversely, the Japanese
complain about the American dry approach to business deals. 3

The significance of a written document in the American legal
system is tremendous. For example, the Statute of Frauds, Parol Evidence
1. INAZO NITOBE, BUSHIDO: TIlE SOUL OF JAPAN (1905).
2. Robert J.Walters, Now That I Ate The Sushi, Do We Have a Dea., 12 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& BUS. 335, 339 (1991).
3. Danian Zhang & Kenji Kuroda, Beware of JapaneseNegotiation Style: How To
Negotiate With Japanese Companies, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 195, 209 (1989).
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Rule, and other theories highlight the importance of a written agreement.
As a result, American business people tend to start a relationship after they
have closed the deal. By contrast, the typical Japanese business enterprise
would not immediately enter into an agreement, especially with a foreign
enterprise. This might be the result of the historical skepticism towards

strangers in the Japanese society.' In any event, the Japanese business
entity will attempt to establish a trusting relationship with their potential
partners before they finally enter into an agreement. This slow process of
trying to know each other before entering into an agreement appears to be
an irritating process for American business people.
The attempt to establish a trustworthy relationship before entering
into a contract goes further. In other words, the Japanese entity will carry
over the established relationship beyond the closing of the deal. The
corollary of this attitude is that the end result of the deal, which is the

written contract itself, is no more than a signed agreement which would
prove a trustworthy relationship has been established. Accordingly, the
Japanese entity would not expect an entity with which they have a
trustworthy relationship to insist on a term which turned out to be a very
bad deal, not to mention initiate a lawsuit.'
In order to reduce the possibilities of a lawsuit, it is important to
identify the problems which may arise in the course of contracting. In
drafting a contract, the parties must envision two significant aspects in
which a problem may arise. One aspect concerns the use of words. The
use of unclear words creates an interpretation problem. This problem is

most prominent when two parties using different languages attempt to
agree to a document written in either language. The second problem
arises when the importance of a written document, as a matter of law,
4. The analysis of the historical skepticism of the Japanese towards strangers and foreigners
is beyond this article, and, therefore, is not discussed.
5. Professor Steven R. Salbu has mentioned in his article that:
[i]n the United States, finely articulated contract terminology combined with a high
incidence of litigation tends to create a mistrustful contracting environment relative to
other cultures. Yet, as contracting in the United States has progressed from classical to
neoclassical and even relational varieties, the American contracting culture may be
moving toward greater flexibility and reliance upon justifiably trustworthy alliances.
In other countries, such as Japan, contracts traditionally have been little more than
declarations of good faith and a general commitment to support future dealings with
another party.
Steven R. Salbu, ParentalCoordinationand Conflict in InternationalJoint Ventures: The Use of
Contract to Address Legal, Linguistic, and Cultural Concerns, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1221,
1232-33 n.52 (1993). In the same article Professor Salbu states that the "Japanese business
people often rely on mutual trust to the exclusion of formal contracting," and that "[t]hey have
traditionally viewed the need to contract as a lack of good faith, potentially injuring future
relations between venture parents." Id. at 1260.
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differs significantly. This will especially be a problem between a Japanese
business enterprise and an American business enterprise because of their
being accustomed to legal systems in which one attaches significant
importance to a written document, and the other does not. These issues
will be discussed separately in the subsequent sections.
This article will describe the difference in attitude towards the
terms of a contract between Japanese business entities and American
business entities. The difference in attitude towards a written document in
America and Japan stems from the differences in the contract law itself.
The most significant difference is an absence of an equivalent to the
Anglo-American Parol Evidence Rule or the Statute of Frauds in Japanese
contract law. This article will highlight this absence and other differences
between Japanese contract law and American contract law by applying
Japanese contract law to the fact patterns of famous American cases.
Finally, this article will propose an ideal method of contracting with an
entity from a different jurisdiction.

B.

The Differences Between Anglo-American Law and Continental
Law

Before discussing the differences between Japanese contract law
and American contract law, one should understand the differences between
Anglo-American law and Continental law, which is the basis of Japanese
law. Generally, modern continental law is based on the will theory. In
other words, the law focuses on the specific intent of the contracting party.
For example, if an individual enters into a contract, the "modern
Continental law, apart from certain requirements of proof . . . asks only,
6
Did [sic] the promisor intend to create a binding duty?"
The origin of the will theory, therefore the origin of Continental
law, can be found in the thoughts of seventeenth century jurists. In the
seventeenth century, the decisive element to contract "was the idea of
deduction from the nature of man as a moral creature and of legal rules
and legal institutions which expressed this ideal of human nature."
Furthermore, in the period when the law was nothing more than a rule
describing the morals of human beings, the courts "searched the
conscience of a defendant by an examination under oath, and believed
[they] could reach subjective data that were beyond the cognizance of a
jury."8
Accordingly, the origins of Continental law relied on the

6.

ROSCOE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 238 (1921).

7. Id. at 253.
8. Id.
at 271.
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metaphysical existence of a natural law which was dedujced from human
morality. As a result, it focused more on the intent and the morality of the
contracting party rather than on the effect created by the manifestation of
that intent.
On the other hand, "Anglo-American jurists paid little or no
attention to the systems of the metaphysical school. " In the wake of the
industrial revolution, the Anglo-American jurists recognized "[tihe need of
stability and certainty in the maturity of law and in the importance of the
social interests in security of acquisitions and security of transactions in a
commercial and industrial society."' 0 The philosophers of this school
thought the source of obligation to a contract was in the form itself."2
Accordingly, the rule was laid down "by parol the party is not obliged."
Furthermore, philosophers say that the American legal system does "not
give effect to promises on the basis of the will of the promisor, although
the [American] courts of equity have shown some tendency to move in that
direction.""

In summary, the origin of Anglo-American law "insists on
uniformity, the [Continental law] on morality; the former on form, the
latter on justice in the ethical sense; the former on remedies, the latter on
duties; the former on rule, the latter on reason."" As a result, these basic
notions still linger on to influence the present-day law in respective
nations.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF
INTERPRETATION AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN THE UNITED
STATES

A. The Criticism of The ParolEvidence Rule
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts says the parol evidence
rule is a rule of substantive law and not a rule of evidence, which "renders
9. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 152 (1921).

10. Id. at 148.
11. See generally POUND, supra note 9.
[I]n the strict law the source of obligation was in the form itself. For in primitive
thinking forms have an intrinsic efficacy. It has often been pointed out that the faith in
legal forms belongs to the same order of thought as faith in forms of incantation and
that legal forms are frequently symbols to be classed psychologically with the symbols
of magic.
Id.
12. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 232 (1881).
13. POUND, supra note 6, at 270.
14. POUND, supra note 9, at 141.
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inoperative prior written agreements as well as prior oral agreements.""s
Accordingly, if the rule is applied literally, when a contract dispute arises,
any prior stipulated agreement or condition which did not appear in the
final written contract, cannot be considered in the trial.
The rigid application of this rule has been widely criticized among
legal scholars. Professor Arthur Corbin stated that "extrinsic evidence is
6
always necessary in the interpretation of a written instrument."
Specifically, the view that the written contract must be ambiguous before
the parties may introduce extrinsic evidence to determine their real
intentions has been criticized. Judge Posner observed that "a clear
document can be rendered unclear-even have its apparent meaning

reversed-by the way in which it connects, or fails to connect" with the
subjects it describes.1 7 "Discrepancy between the word and the world is a
common source of interpretive problems everywhere." 8 Furthermore, he
criticized the rule because it assumes a precision in language which cannot
exist, and because it requires the trial judge to determine the true intent of
the parties in a transaction to which he is far removed both in time and in

circumstance. 9
While the rule has been criticized for its rigid application,
American contract law is departing from such a rigid application. For
example, the Uniform Commercial Code allows evidence of course of

dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance to play a significant
role in the interpretation of commercial agreements.2° This requirement
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 cmt. a (1979). Section 213 states that:
1) A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is
inconsistent with them. 2) A binding completely integrated agreement discharges prior
agreements to the extent that they are within its scope. 3) An integrated agreement that
is not binding or that is voidable and avoided does not discharge a prior agreement.
But an integrated agreement, even though not binding, may be effective to render
inoperative a term which would have been part of the agreement if it had not been
integrated.
Id. at §213 cmt. a.
16. Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 161, 188-89 (1965).
17. AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Management Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1995).
18. Id. at 577.
19. URS Corp. v. Ash, 427 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (II. App. Ct. 1981).
20. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1994). This section provides that:
[tlerms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression
of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral
agreement, but may be explained or supplemented (a) by course of dealing or usage of
trade (Section 1-205) or by course of performance (Section 2-208); and (b) by evidence
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arises from the notion that commercial merchants are better off being
bound to the actual rules which bind ordinary merchants in the real
commercial world, than to be bound by the court-made rules which are
sometimes far from being practical in a commercial sense."
B. The Meaning of Interpretation
In international negotiations, it is almost impossible to ascertain the
true intention of the parties without introducing extrinsic evidence.
Therefore, the finality of a written agreement may cause difficulty in
performance because the meaning placed on a word is influenced, among
other things, by the interpreter's culture, age, and environment. For
example, a person who grew up in Boston might attach a different meaning
to a particular word than a person who grew up in Los Angeles.
Furthermore, a Japanese speaking person and an English speaking person
may attach different meanings to the same word as well. Even though a
rigid application of the rule has been criticized, the importance of a written
contract still remains quite intact. The written contract is still "meant to
finalize and formalize the agreement, so the use of less formalized oral
22
evidence to determine its meaning is considered retrograde."
The emphasis placed on a written contract is seen in the famous
chicken case.? In that case, a contract dispute arose between an American
seller and a Swiss buyer regarding the sale of chicken.24 The terms of the
agreement provided as follows: "US Fresh Frozen Chicken, Grade A,
Government Inspected, Eviscerated 2 1/2 - 3 lbs. and 1 1/2 - 2 lbs., each,
all chicken individually wrapped in cryovac packed in secured fiber
cartons or wooden boxes, suitable for export.""5 A dispute arose when the
chicken sent to Switzerland turned out to be fowls and stewing chickens,
of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended
also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
Id. at § 2-202.
21. See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Article 2B Preface: Meeting the Information Age,
V (UCC Discussion Draft, Dec. 1, 1995); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 8
(1974).
22. Salbu, supra note 5, at 1249. Professor Salbu further states that "even when there is
ambiguity, [the American] proclivity is to favor drafting intent over negotiating intent. The
[drafting] party's assertion of intent in choosing terms is generally considered more compelling
than a[n] [agreeing] party's statements concerning its understanding of intent at the time of
negotiation." Id.
23. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 117.
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rather than fryers and broilers as intended by the buyer.2 6 The New York
court said the issue in the case was "what is chicken?"27
The court held the fowls and stewing chickens sent to the buyers
"did coincide with one of the dictionary meanings" of chicken; the buyer
had the burden of proving the word was "used in the narrower rather than
the broader sense;""s and the buyer had not discharged its burden.2' As a
result, the court held the stewing chickens sent to the buyer were well
within the definition of chicken, and, therefore, held for the American
seller. 10 Thus, it can be said that instead of determining "what is
chicken?" the court determined "[wihether the goods the seller sent to the
buyer was chicken or not." 3'
The court did not look into whether the word chicken, if literally
translated into German, would constitute the same meaning in English.,,
Failing to look at a word's direct translation may produce problems when
a Japanese person enters into a contract with an American. For example,
according to the Shogakukan, Progressive: English- JapaneseDictionary,
the word chicken has more than one meaning as a noun." Its first meaning
"is a 'niwatori,'3 4 a chick (within one year of age); generally, a young
chicken. cf. fowl."'
It follows that Japanese people will ordinarily
associate a young tender chicken with the word chicken.16
If the courts do not to consider this extrinsic evidence just because
the judge finds the word unambiguous, a very unfair result may follow.
Furthermore, given the hierarchy of languages in the context of
international business transactions, those who have English as the native
language would have an advantage over other parties unless the courts are
willing to consider the cultural differences in societies. What is also

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 121.
FrigalimentImporting, 190 F. Supp. at 121.

30. Id.
31. MARVIN A. CHIRLESTIEN, CONTRACTS 78(1990).
32. Frigaliment Importing, 190 F. Supp. at 116.
33. OKANA KATSUIINO JITSUYO SHIN [SHOGAKUKAN, PROGRESSIVE: ENGLISH-JAPANESE
DICTIONARY] 625 (3d ed. 1985).
34. Niwatori, is a domestic bird belonging to the pheasant family that is for edibles, eggs,
and appreciation. Id.
35. Id..
36. It must be noted that the word chicken is used as is in the Japanese language. In other
words, an ordinary person without any special knowledge of the English language would
understand the word chicken if one were to use it.
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troublesome, is that in the language context, some English words are used
as is in Japanese which do not have precisely the same meaning. For

example, the word mansion in English would describe a large expensive
home. On the other hand, the word mansion used as is in Japanese would
describe something close to an apartment house or a tenement house." If a
Japanese real estate developer and an American company were to enter
into a contract to lease a mansion, the result would be significantly

different in a Japanese court than in an American court.
III. How WRITTEN AGREEMENTS AND THE ISSUE OF
INTERPRETATION IS DEALT WITH IN JAPAN
Japanese contract law constitutes a part of the Japanese civil code.
The Japanese civil code adopted the German code in 1866.38 They adopted

the German code at that time in the hope they would become the Germany
of Asia. 9 Germany, which was a small country at that time, was
surrounded by France, Britain, Russia, and otier powerful nations. The
Japanese, after their civil revolution, desired to become a civilized nation
in the western sense, and therefore, searched for a role model in the
western civilization. As a result, they found themselves in a similar
situation to the Germans.
Additionally, the Japanese felt the way the Germans governed their
country fitted the needs for their own.40 Accordingly, the Japanese adopted
the law of that country.4' Still, in modern society, the civil code plays an
important role in business transactions although the Commercial Code will
also play a significant role.

37. If the reader has difficulty in comprehending this notion, think about the following.
The word futon, which is Japanese, would describe a soft cover used when sleeping in the United
States. In Japan, however, the word describes the cover, but also includes the mattress that goes
beneath the human body when we sleep. Similarly, the word hibachi, also a Japanese word,
would describe anything that has a grill with fire burning underneath. On the other hand, a
typical Japanese person would associate the word with a specific type of pot (which can be
interpreted as (b)hachi) made of ceramic with fire (which is interpreted as hi) burning from a pile
of charcoal.
38. See generally MINPO, Law No. 89 of 1896, Law No. 9 of 1898.
39. 1 RYOTARO SHIBA, TOqU GA GOTOKu 235 (1980). See also 3 ZENTARO KITAGAWA,
DOING BUSINESS INJAPAN § 3.01(4) (1990).
40. SHIBA, supra note 39, at 237. See also KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 3.01(4).
41. For a more detailed discussion on why the Japanese adopted German customs, see
SHIBA, supra note 39, at 74-75, 232-40 (describing the era after the Japanese Civil Revolution up
to when one of the prominent politicians of that era, Takamori Saigo, led an attempted coupd'dtat). See also 2 RYOTARO SHIBA, TOBU GA GOTOKU 161 (1980).

66

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 3:57

A.

The Japanese Civil Code and the Relation With the Continental
Law
The basic theory behind the Continental law, as discussed
previously, is the notion of the will theory. Under the will theory, the law
focuses on the intention of the parties, and gives little attention to the
appearances of the intention of the parties.2 On the other hand, the
American common law is based on the relations theory." Under this
theory, the law focuses on the objective relation between the parties and
not the subjective intent of the party or parties."
Under the will theory, the Japanese Civil Code established the
principle that a "contract is a legal product which is created by the meeting
of two or more conflicting wills."" This general principle seemed to
operate until the industrial revolution. With the increase of trade business,
focusing only on the intention of the party produced problems because of
an individual's effect on third parties' reliance on their expression of their
intention." As a result, principles such as the requirement of honesty and
loyalty, developed in order to impose restrictions on the will theory."
B.

The Fundamental Principles of the Japanese Civil Code and
ContractLaw
There are three fundamental Civil Code principles constituting the
Japanese Civil Code. These include: 1) the freedom of contract; 2)
liability for negligence; and 3) the ownership principle. The freedom of
contract consists of four important aspects: 4' first, the freedom to make a
contract; second, freedom to enter into a contract with a chosen party;
third, freedom to determine the contents of the contract; and finally, the
freedom from formal requirements.49
42. See generally GILMORE, supra note 21, at 17.
43, This theory of relation must be absolutely distinguished from the so-called relational
contract theory. GILMORE, supra note 21, at 106 n.7.
44. GILMORE, supra note 21, at 41-45.
45. SAKAE WAGATSUMA, SHIN-TEl MINPO SOUSOKU 244 (1965); KIKUO ISHIDA, KEIYAKU
NO KOUSOKURYOKU [THE BINDING EFFECT OF CONTRACTS], 1 MINPO KOGI 88.
46. POUND, supra note 9, at 148.
47. TsUYOSHI KINOSHITA, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARISON OF JAPANESE AND
AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 8; KEIYAKU-HO GAISETSU, CONTRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS 1, 4.
48. 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 1.02 (1).
49. As Professor Kitagawa states, "fulnder the Civil and Commercial Codes, contracts are
consensual and thus need not be committed to writing to be effective. In fact, formality
requirements are alien to the Civil and Commercial Codes and even a gift contract may be
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Because of the practical effect of the fourth requirement, namely,
the freedom from formal requirements, Japanese judges have the luxury of
considering extrinsic evidence even if the contract is purported to be
integrated.'* Accordingly, the negotiators are accustomed to drafting
documents with this notion in mind. Furthermore, because written
agreements are nothing more than a document evincing mutual trust, the
contractual documents tend to be very short.
The Civil Code, which includes contract law, starts with general
provisions. Article one provides that: "1) individual rights are subject to
public policy. 2) The exercise of rights and performance of obligation
shall comply with the requirements of loyalty, and exercised with honesty.
3) Abuse of rights is not tolerated."" In performing the obligations of the
contract, time of performance, place of performance, and other specific
details may raise a problem. The law and the agreement itself may be able
to provide for the details, but in solving most of the problems, "the
parties, especially the promisor, are required to act honestly in order to
resolve the problem."' 2 In other words, the resolution of a problem is
premised on the honesty of the promisor. These principles were defined in
the French Civil Code"3 and the German Civil Code,- but not specifically
in the Japanese Civil Code. However, treatises and cases have taken the
same view.55
In interpreting the loyalty and honesty requirement, the Saiko
Saibansho, the Supreme Court of Japan, held the "principle of loyalty and
concluded orally." Id. There are, however, certain contracts which do require a certain written
document be submitted and filed with a governmental entity. This requirement, however, does
not prevent parties from creating a contract, and, furthermore, is in the realm of administrative
law. Accordingly, it is outside the scope of this article.
50. 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39 Professor KITAGAWA provides that there are a number of
reasons for the differences in resolving ambiguities or uncertainties.
[Flirst, the maxim that a contract is to be interpreted so as to be effective and valid:
second, Japanese judges, being unhampered by either a parol evidence rule or by

exclusive rules of evidence, may concentrate directly on the parties 'purpose; and
third, optional provisions which clarify or supplement the parties' intentions often
dispense with the necessity for drafting detailed contract clauses.
Id. § 1.09(4).
51. MINPO [CIVIL CODE] art. 1 (1886) (Japan).
52. KIYOSHI IGARASHI ET AL., RIGHTS UNDER THE CIVIL CODE, I MINPO KoGI.
53. CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 1134 (Fr.).
54. Biurgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) [CIVIL CODE] art. 242 (G.D.R.).

55. Because Japanese law is not a system similar to common law, the significance of a prior
disposition of a court is somewhat less than that of a precedent in the United States. Treatises,
however, have a significant influence in determining the outcome of the cases. See generally
Wean Khing Wong, Protecting American Software in Japan, 8 COMPUTER L.J. 111, 115-16
(1988); KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 3.02(a).
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honesty not only applies to exercise of rights and performance of
6
obligations, but also constitutes a criteria in interpreting contracts.'
Accordingly, in determining the rights and obligations of the parties to a
contract, any evidence would be considered to determine whether the
parties acted in a loyal and honest way towards each other.
IV. CASES WHICH DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION AND
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND THE JAPANESE LAW

The following cases describe the development of the problem of
interpretation and the parol evidence rule. The first case is from the 1928
New York Court of Appeals where Judges Andrew, Kellog, and Cardozo
sat on the bench."7 The second group consists of three cases from the
California Supreme Court lead by Justice Traynor." The third group are
cases from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit where Judge
Posner sat in as the Chief Judge.' 9
A. Mitchill v. Lath6o

1. The Disposition by the Original Court
The facts of the case are as follows: defendants, the Laths, hoped
to sell a parcel of farmland. On the other side of the road they owned an
icehouse which stood on the land owned by a third party. The plaintiff,
Mrs. Mitchill, thought of purchasing the land, but she thought the icehouse
to be objectionable. Subsequently, the Laths "orally promised and agreed
to remove the icehouse"6 1 the following spring, in consideration of the
purchase of their farm by Mrs. Mitchill. As a result of relying on the
promise, Mrs. Mitchill purchased the property and made substantial
improvements on the property. However, the Laths did not remove the
icehouse.

56. Judgment of July 5, 1957. Saikosai [Supreme Court], 11 MINSHU 1193 (Japan).
57. Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
58. Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W.
Thomas Draynage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968); Delta Dynamics, Inc. v.
Arito, 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1968).
59. Briston v. Drake, Inc., 41 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 1994); AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic
Management Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1995); Cannon v. Wittek Co. Int'l, 60 F.3d
1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
60. Mitchill, 160 N.E. at 646.
61. Id.
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The court had to determine whether the oral promise, which was
not included in the final written contract, could be enforced. 2 The court
stated that in order for an oral agreement to vary the written contract
(1) The agreement must in form be a collateral one; (2) it
must not contradict express or implied provisions of the
written contract; (3) it must be one that parties would not
ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing, or, put in
another way, an inspection of the written contract, read in
the light of surrounding circumstances, must not indicate
that the writing appears 'to contain the engagements of the
parties, and to define the object and measure the extent of
such engagement.' Or, again, it must not be so clearly
connected with the principal transaction as to be part and
parcel of it.63
The court found that the agreement did not fulfill any of the
requirements." Accordingly, the court held the oral agreement the Laths
had made was not enforceable. 5 Therefore, the Laths had no obligation to
remove the icehouse."6

2. Disposition by a Hypothetical Japanese Court
What would happen if this case was tried in a hypothetical
Japanese court? Would the result change? We will start the analysis by
applying the general principle of the Civil Code. First, as discussed
previously, the court will not prevent the introduction of the evidence that
the Laths had made an oral agreement with Mrs. Mitchill. Accordingly,
the oral agreement between the parties would constitute evidence. At this
point, it would already make a significant difference because the only
reason the majority in the New York Court of Appeals could not consider
the evidence was the existence of the parol evidence rule.,, Furthermore,
the reader of the case can easily infer how the court was reluctant to hold
for the Laths by looking at the court's expression such as, "we are not
62. Id.

63. Id. at 647.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 646.
66. Judge Lehmen dissents in this case and attempts to divide the agreement into two parts.
In other words, Judge Lehmen found the written agreement to convey the land and the oral
agreement to remove the icehouse to be two separate agreements. Accordingly, the agreement
does not fit the third condition, and, therefore, is not barred by the parol evidence rule. Mitchill,
160 N.E. at 648-50.

67. Id. at 647.
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dealing with moral delinquencies,"" implying that the Laths were morally
blameworthy.
The Civil Code further provides that the principle of loyalty and
honesty also require the courts to interpret the contract accordingly. The
problem here is that if the court were to interpret the contract itself
according to the trust and honesty principle, it would make no difference
from the result the New York court reached because the obligation is not
provided for in the contract. The main focus, however, of the loyalty and
honesty requirement is on the conduct of the parties, and, therefore, the
Civil Code would require the Laths to remove the icehouse.
In Sanjo-Kikai-Seisakusho, Inc. v. Sanko Diesel Inc., 61 the
defendants attempted to escape the liability of paying the amount of money
for the business which they acquired from the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had
transferred the business according to the contract which was made several
years ago. Furthermore, the defendants had made improvements on the
business and had used the facilities which were assigned to the defendants
according to the contract.
The dispute arose because the defendants had not paid the purchase
amount for the business they acquired from the plaintiffs. The defendants'
argument was that the transfer of the business was not provided for in the
Articles of Incorporation pursuant to article 168, paragraph 1, item 6 of
the Commercial Code. In other words, the defendants were making an
argument substantially similar to that of the Laths which is you did not put
it in writing. The Japanese Supreme Court, however, held the defendants'
argument was against honesty and loyalty. The Japanese Supreme Court
explained that agreeing to perform pursuant to an oral agreement and
subsequently taking advantage of the fact the agreement was not reduced to
writing was in violation of the trust and honesty requirement.
Applying the principle derived from Sanjo-Kikai-Seisakusho, we
can infer that the Japanese court would require the Laths to remove the
icehouse even if the language was not provided in the written agreement.
Furthermore, although the Civil Code does not specifically provide for it,
Japanese contract law requires the parties to extend honesty and trust to
collateral contract duties. 0
In other words, requirements such as
disclosure at the time of the agreement and informing the other party of
any difficulties during the performance of the duty are requirements which

68. id. at 646.
69. Judgment of Sept. 11, 1986, Saikosai [Supreme Court], 624 HANREI TIMES 127
(Japan).
70. See generally 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 1.03(3)(0.
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must be complied with even in the absence of such terms in the contract."
Accordingly, the court would look to any collateral duties which the
parties were required to perform.
Another analysis may be made by applying a theory which is
analogous to the Anglo-American estoppel theory. Post-war Japanese
cases show the variable application of the trust and honesty requirement.
One of the concepts which can be derived from these applications by the
courts is a concept which is similar to the promissory estoppel theory. It is
contended that the application of the principle was used to police the
parties' antimoralistic conduct. 2 Some cases discuss situations in which a
party conducts itself in a certain way and performs in a way contradicting
the previous conduct. These are situations where the courts are applying a
theory similar to the Anglo-American estoppel theory." Accordingly, the
result a Japanese court may reach could be predicted by applying the
promissory estoppel theory without applying the parol evidence rule.
Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts provides in pertinent
part that:
[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee
or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for
7
breach may be limited as justice requires. 4
An illustration provided in section 90 describes a situation which is
similar to the fact pattern in the Mitchill case, except for the existence of
the written document. If the written document constituted only a part of
the evidence, and there is other parol evidence, this illustration perfectly
fits the facts of the Mitchill case.
The illustration provides that "A promises B not to foreclose, for a
specified time, a mortgage which A holds on B's land. B thereafter makes
improvements on the land. A's promise is binding and may be enforced by
denial of foreclosure before the time has elapsed."Is This illustration may
be further simplified by describing the situation as follows: A promises to
do X. B performs Y relying on A's promise. A's promise shall be
enforced. In the Mitchill case, A is the Laths, B is Mrs. Mitchill, X is
71. 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 1.09 (3)(f) (Incidental Duties).
72. IGARASHI ET AL., supra note 52, at 20.

73. Id.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979).

75. Id. § 90 cmt. a, illus. 2.
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removing the icehouse, and Y is purchasing the land and "[spending]
considerable sums in improving the property for use as a summer
residence." 6 The court would decide that A's (the Lath's) promise should
be enforced. Accordingly, the Japanese courts reach a contrary result by
utilizing a concept similar to the promissory estoppel theory, and
therefore, would enforce the Lath's oral promise.
According to the Mitchill Court, in many cases courts have held
the introduction of "collateral contracts said to have been the inducing
cause of the main contract"" was improper. The court further cited many
cases as authority, holding "an oral stipulation, said to have been the
inducing cause for the subsequent execution of the lease itself, concerning
some act to be done by the landlord, or some condition as to the leased
premises, might not be shown."" Japanese courts, however, would likely
arrive at a different result in each of these cases. If the opponent is able to
produce ample evidence, including prior oral agreements, and in fact, any
relevant evidence to establish bona fide reliance on the oral agreement, the
judge will enforce the collateral agreement pursuant to the honesty and
loyalty requirement.
3. Disposition by an American Court in the Present Day
Application of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (hereinafter
Restatement), ' 9 which is relied on as authority by many courts in the
present day, may render a different result in the Mitchill case. According
to the Restatement, if the document is a binding integrated agreement, it
"discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with
them. "0 Furthermore, if the document is completely integrated, it
8
"discharges prior agreements to the extent that they are within its scope." '
Whether a document is an integrated document is "determined by the trial
judge in the first instance as a question preliminary to an interpretative
ruling or to the application of the parol evidence rule."' 2 Furthermore,
determining whether the documents are integrated "is a question of fact to
76. Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
77. Id. at 648.
78. Id. The Mitchill case cites cases such as Daly v. Piza, 94 N.Y.S. 154 (1905); Love v.
Hamel, 69 N.Y.S. 251 (1901); Taylor v. Hopper, 62 N.Y. 649 (1878) ); Wilson v. Deen, 74

N.Y. 531 (1875); Johnson v. Oppenheim, 55 N.Y. 280 (1873).
79. This section will refer to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as the Restatement
because of the lack of necessity to refer to the first Restatement.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1).
81. Id. § 213(2).
82. Id. § 209 cmt. c.
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be determined in accordance with all relevant evidence."" In other words,
the judge will take all the relevant evidence into consideration and then
determine whether the document is integrated or not. Accordingly, in the
Mitchill case, the trial judge would take into consideration the fact that the
Laths had orally made an agreement to remove the icehouse to determine
whether the document was integrated.
The New York Court of Appeals found that the document was
integrated, and therefore, did not allow the evidence to be introduced.8
However, under the modem view, the evidence would likely be admissible
because the Restatement employs a more liberal standard than that used in
the Mitchill case. Furthermore, the jury (assuming there is a jury trial)
would consider the oral agreement made between the two parties and
probably would require the Laths to remove the icehouse.
This conclusion shows that the American courts are heading in the
direction towards the admission of any relevant evidence as long as it does
not create fraud. The problem of fraud is prevented by the screening
process conducted by the trial judge. The trial judge determines whether
credible evidence exists as to any prior or simultaneous written or oral
agreements in addition to any other parol evidence. If the trial judge
determines such evidence exists, the judge will determine the written
document was not integrated. This will allow any evidence to come in,
permitting the trier of fact to determine whether there was, in fact, an oral
agreement. This screening process, conducted by the judge, seems to be a
sufficient barrier because the judge is familiar with contract law as well as
the rules of evidence. The judges will be able to assess the potential harm
which the introduction of parol evidence may cause to the opponent of
such evidence, and will be able to avoid any injustice which might be
created therein. The trend towards destruction of the parol evidence rule
is further carried out in the following California cases from 1968.
B. The Traynor TrilogyM
1. Masterson v. Sine
In 1968, the Supreme Court of California, by the opinion of
Justice Traynor, substantially decreased the significance of the parol
evidence rule.96 It started with the case of Masterson v. Sine.' The facts
83.
84.
85.
found in
86.

Id.
Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
The discussion of these three cases which emasculated the parol evidence rule can be
PETER LINZER, A CONTRACT ANTHOLOGY 313 (1st ed. 1989).
Id.
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of the case are as follows: Dallas Masterson and his wife Rebecca, who
were the plaintiffs, conveyed a ranch to the defendants Medora, Dallas'
sister, and Lu Sines, the appellant in the case, by deed which stated:
[r]eserving unto the Grantors herein an option to purchase
the above described property on or before February 25,
1968, for the same consideration as being paid heretofore
plus their depreciation value of any improvements
Grantees may add to the property from and after two and a
half years from this date.u
After the conveyance the Grantor was adjudicated bankrupt. The trustee
in bankruptcy and Rebecca brought suit to establish their right to exercise
the option."9
The defendant grantees attempted to introduce into evidence the
testimony which would show "that the parties wanted the property kept in
the Masterson family and that the option was therefore personal to the
grantors and could not be exercised by the trustee in bankruptcy."'
However, the trial court rejected the defendants' argument and excluded
the evidence that the option was personal to the grantors." The Supreme
Court of California lead by Justice Traynor reversed, holding the trial
judge erred in excluding the extrinsic evidence.92
Justice Traynor initiated the discussion by describing that the
"California cases have stated that whether there was an integration is to be
determined solely from the face of the instrument, (citation omitted) and
that the question for the court is whether it 'appears to be a complete
agreement.'" 93 Justice Traynor further stated that "[n]either of these strict
formulations of the rule, however, has been consistently applied. "9' He
offered two policies accommodating the parol evidence rule. One was that
"written evidence is more accurate that human memory," and the other
was based on the "fear that fraud or unintentional invention by witnesses
interested in the outcome of the litigation will mislead the finder of facts."95
It seems Justice Traynor was specifically referring to the jury by using the
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
Id. at 562.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 567.
Masterson, 436 P.2d at 563.
Id.
95. Id. at 564.
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words "finder of facts." This is because later Justice Traynor stated the
"tendency of the jury [is] to find through sympathy and without a
dispassionate assessment of the probability of fraud or faulty memory that
the parties made an oral agreement collateral to the written contract, or
that preliminary tentative agreements were not abandoned when omitted
from the writing."96
As a result, Justice Traynor concluded that
"[e]vidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded only when
the fact finder is likely to be misled.""7 Again, in this context, it is safe to
say that fact finder describes the jury. Further, Justice Traynor provided
that the standards in which the credibility of the evidence could be assessed
is found in the Restatement and the Uniform Commercial Code." The
corollary of this argument is that the parol evidence rule is based at least in
substantial part, if not wholly, on the court's distrust towards the jury.
The danger of not having a rule similar to the parol evidence rule
is substantially reduced in the Japanese courts because the Japanese legal
system does not utilize the jury system. In other words, all the
proceedings in Japan are tried as a bench trial. Accordingly, the danger
that the trier of fact would be misled would be substantially decreased or at
least reduced to the level as if the parol evidence rule was in force. This is
not to say the jury is never capable of assessing the truth, but to describe
the nonexistence of the parol evidence rule in Japan would not be a
problem, as in the United States, from the aspect of the policy described
by Justice Traynor.
2. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Draynage & Rigging
Co.
The second case in which the Supreme Court of California, lead
by Justice Traynor, discussed the problems of interpretation and the parol
evidence rule was Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage &
Rigging Co. Inc." This was an action for damages to the plaintiff's
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 240(1)(b) (1932). The Restatement
permits proof of a collateral agreement if it is "[sluch an agreement as might naturally be made
as a separate agreement by parties situated as were the parties to the written contract." Id. In
other words, the Restatement employs a might naturally test. The Uniform Commercial Code
applies a more liberal test. Section 2-202 cmt. 3, provides in pertinent part that "[i]f the
additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the
document in the view of the court, then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the
trier of fact." U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (1994). In other words, the Uniform Commercial Code
employs a would certainly test.
99. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Draynage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641
(Cal. 1968).
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property under an indemnity clause in a contract. '® The defendant entered
into a contract to provide labor and equipment to remove and replace an
upper metal cover of the plaintiffs steam turbine. The written agreement
provided, in pertinent part, that the defendant "agreed to perform the work
at [its] own risk and 'expense' and 'indemnify' plaintiff 'against all loss,
damage, expense, and liability resulting from . . injury to property,
arising out of or in any way connected with the performance of this
contract." ' 0 In the course of the performance, the cover fell and injured
the exposed rotor of the turbine. Subsequently, the trial judge found that
the indemnity clause covered the injury and held for the plaintiff. 0
The issue in the case was whether the trial court erred by
excluding the evidence offered by the defendant in the attempt to prove
that "in the indemnity clause the parties meant to cover injury to property
of third parties only and not to plaintiffs property."'03 In holding that the
trial court erroneously refused to consider extrinsic evidence offered to
show the indemnity clause in the contract was not intended to cover
injuries to plaintiffs property, the court stated that "[slome courts have
expressed the opinion that contractual obligations are created by the mere
use of certain words, whether or not there was any intention to incur such
obligations. "'1' This language describes the theory of objective intent or
anti-will theory which is in the tradition of the Holmesians.10 Justice
Traynor further stated that "[u]nder this view, contractual obligations flow,
not from the intention of the parties but from the fact that they used certain
magic words. Evidence of the parties' intention therefore becomes
irrelevant. "' This describes, although exaggerated, the objective theory
which is the foundation of the traditional Anglo-American common law
system.
Justice Traynor, as a prominent judge in the Anglo-American legal
system, held that in California "the intention of the parties as expressed in
the contract is the source of contractual rights and duties."' 7 Furthermore,
Justice Traynor stated that "[a] court must ascertain and give effect to this
intention by determining what the parties meant by the words they used." "0
100. Id. at 643.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 644.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, Justice Traynor also said "the exclusion of relevant, extrinsic
evidence to explain the meaning of a written instrument could be justified
only if it were feasible to determine the meaning the parties gave to the
words from the instrument alone."'109 This assertion brings into the legal
analysis the metaphysics which the Anglo-American legal system has
vigorously rejected.1'' This case describes the movement of the relation
theory towards the will theory. Justice Traynor concluded by stating that
words "do not have absolute and constant references.""' In other words,
in Justice Traynor's view, the traditional theory of interpretation,
integration, and the parol evidence rule no longer has a place in American
jurisprudence.
3. Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arito
The third case is Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arito,"' where the
manufacturer brought suit against the distributor for the breach of the
distributorship agreement. The written distributorship agreement provided
in pertinent part that, "'[s]hould [the distributor] fail to distribute in any
one year the minimum number of devices to be distributed by it . . .this
agreement shall be subject to termination' by [the manufacturer] on 30
days' notice."'" The written contract further provided that "[i]n the event
of breach of this agreement by either party, the party prevailing in any
action for damages or enforcement of the terms of this [a]greement shall
be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees."" 4 The distributor failed to
distribute the minimum number of devices, and the manufacturer
terminated the contract and brought suit to recover the damages for the
distributor's failure to purchase the first years' quota under the agreement.
The trial court rejected the distributer's argument that the only remedy
available for the manufacturer was to terminate the contract, and entered
judgment for the manufacturer. "I
In this case, Justice Traynor held that
109. Id. at 641.
110. KINOSHITA, supra note 47, at 4. According to Professor Kinoshita, Holmes said that
contractual liability accrues, not because of a meeting of the minds or a true synthesis of wills
existed, but because the words used by the promisor to describe his acceptance reasonably
induced a bargain from the other party to infer that business was to take place. Furthermore,
Kinoshita cites Holmes' words: "Contract theory is exclusively formal and external." Id. (citing
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 195-264 (1881)).

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 644.
Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arito, 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1968).
Id. at 786.
Id.
Id.
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[t]he test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain
the meaning of a written instrument is not whether it
appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on its
face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove
a meaning, to which the language of the instrument is
reasonably susceptible."'
The court found the language of the termination clause to be
ambiguous because it was susceptible to two reasonable interpretations.'"
One was that the parties may have included the termination clause to spell
out with specificity the condition on which the manufacturer would be
excused from further performance under the contract."' The other
reasonable interpretation, according to Justice Traynor, was that it was
intended "to set forth the exclusive remedy for a failure to meet the quota
in any year."" 9 As a result, the court held the trial court erred in
excluding the evidence offered to prove the meaning of the termination
clause contended for by the distributor. 12
In this case, Justice Mosk, who concurred in the previous two
2
cases,' ' dissented by noting that "[g]iven two experienced businessmen
dealing at arm's length, both represented by competent counsel, it has
become virtually impossible under recently evolving rules of evidence to
draft a written contract that will produce predictable results in court." ' ' 12
This opinion fairly describes the problem of not having a rule giving
priority to a written agreement. However, an argument that the parties
disagree on the interpretation of the contract language renders the contract
ambiguous, might prevail in court. 23 Thus, if that situation is toarise, the
meaning of a written document will be reduced to nothing more than one
of the evidences.
The three cases discussed, however, do not exhibit the general
rules in the American courts today. The courts still hold valid the parol
evidence rule and exclude parol evidence which does not pass a certain
116. Id. at 787 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P,2d at 641).
117. Delta Dynamics, Inc., 446 P.2d at 787.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d
at 648.
122. Delta Dynamics, Inc., 446 P.2d at 789.
123. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Globe Indem. Co., 225 N.W.2d 831, 837 (Minn. 1975).
Although heavily criticized and virtually overruled, it was the law in Minnesota that the very fact
the two parties disagree to the interpretation of a particular word renders that word ambiguous.
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contractual muster. The following cases describe the present state of the
rule.
C. The Rule in the Present Day
A practitioner must bear in mind that the rules which can be
extracted from the three California cases are rather extreme. Accordingly,
the present general view adopted by courts must be determined. At least
one court has considered the rule recently. The next three cases were
decided in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by
Judge Posner.
1. Briston v. Drake Street, Inc.2'
The Briston v. Drake Street, Inc. case arose from a breach of an
employment contract. The plaintiff was hired by the defendant to be an
associate producer of a play for the defendant who was the author and the
producer of the play.'25 The plaintiff was seeking the salary she would
have received between the termination and the scheduled expiration of the
contract.'1' The written agreement provided that the defendant would be
authorized to terminate the contract upon thirty days prior written notice,
or if the employer should cease conducting its business, or if the employer
becomes insolvent. The written agreement further provided that the only
ground on which the defendant could terminate the contract without
liability was the plaintiff's conviction of a crime.'" The remedies in the
agreement provided that "if the employee is terminated by employer for
any reason other than a conviction of illegal acts in connection with the
performance of her duties under the agreement then such termination shall
be deemed a breach of the agreement."','

Additionally, the contract

included a standard integration clause.1'2 The trial court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the written agreement was clear and unequivocal
on its face. ' 30 The court allowed testimony of the defendant that the
payment of the salary was contingent on the show remaining open,
notwithstanding the plaintiff's testimony that she had "insisted on an

124. Briston v. Drake Street, Inc., 41 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 1994).

125. Id. at 350.
126. Id.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 345.
Briston, 41 F.3d at 350.
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ironclad contract precisely because of the incessant if transient firings to
which the defendant had subjected her.""'
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, lead by Judge
Posner, reversed the trial judge's ruling and held that the contract was
clear on its face, and the admission of the evidence to contradict the
writing was barred by the parol evidence rule.' 2 The court said that:
[i]f a contract so drafted can be upended by the selfserving oral testimony of one party to it that his duty to
perform was actually dependent on a condition nowhere
expressed in the contract and flatly contradicted by what is
expressed in the contract, .

.

. the parol evidence rule is

dead and integration clauses ineffectual."'
The court further noted that it had no intention of abolishing the
rule.'4 The court also explained how the dangers of using the parol
evidence rule are prevented. The screening by the judge, (allowing the
submission of extrinsic evidence to the judge for a determination whether a
knowledgeable insider would think the written contract meant something
different from what it appeared to mean),' and the judge's consideration
of evidence of trade usage,", are the devices which the judges use to
prevent absurd results.", One of the reasons, although not expressly
mentioned in the opinion, the court invoked the parol evidence rule was
that the person adversely affected was an employee who was sexually
harassed by the employer. The doctrine of contra proferentum, often
mentioned in insurance cases to prevent unjust results to the insured, is
probably the key in this case."' In other words, the proponent of the parol
131. Id. at 350-51.
132. Id. at 351.
133. Id.
134. id. at 345.
135. Only if the judge is persuaded by the evidence does he allow the jury to consider it.
This was referred to by this court as being the "doctrine of extrinsic ambiguity." Id. at 351-52.
136. The court explains that usage of trade, "because it is evidence about public facts,
public meanings, it is less easy to fake. Allowing it into evidence therefore does less harm to the
desire of parties who enter into written contract to fix their agreement in a form that will protect
commitments against being upset by juries." Briston, 41 F.3d at 352.
137. Id.
138. Similarly, in Japanese cases, the doctrine of contra proferentum is invoked. For
example, adhesion contracts are generally interpreted in favor of the party who is the draftee. In
a Tokyo Superior Court case where the landlord drafted a written agreement providing that "in
the default of the tenant's payment of the rent for a month, the landlord will acquire the right to
the tenant's immediate evacuation regardless of the existence of a security deposit," the court
held that the parties in these situations usually intend only to enter into a lease agreement and do
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evidence cannot, by self serving testimony, establish ambiguity in order to
introduce the evidence especially when the proponent is in a better
bargaining position.
2. AM International, Inc. v. Graphic Management Associates, Inc.'"
The facts of this case are as follows:
both parties were
manufacturers of printing machines used in the newspaper business. One
of these machines was called a "newspaper inserting machine," and it
came equipped with a Missed Insert Repair System (MIRS). These are
complicated and expensive machines, which must be customized to the
purchaser's specifications.' AM brought a patent infringement suit which
ended in a settlement including a license agreement, effective on the day of
the settlement.' 4 This agreement entitled AM to a royalty of $200,000 on
each MIRS-equipped newspaper inserting machine made by GMA and
shipped after the settlement date and before the expiration date of the
patent, which was to expire approximately three years later."
Furthermore, an exception to this agreement was inserted
providing that "beginning as of January 1, 1991 and continuing to July 23,
1991 royalty shall accrue on the receipt by GMA of a bona fide purchase
order for a product, provided that product is shipped prior to December
31, 1991." " Thereafter, GMA was ordered to provide nine machines to a
purchaser.T 4 Four of them were not shipped until after December 31,
1991. The other five were shipped between September and November of
1991, and thus before December 31. AM contended royalty was due on
these machines.
The court, in AM International, Inc., held that in determining
whether contract language is ambiguous or not, courts must look to the
objective and subjective evidence of ambiguity. ", The court reinstated the
rule that "a self serving statement that a party did not understand the

not intend to give effect to the printed words unless they are specifically negotiated and given
attention to by the parties. Accordingly, even though the whole contract was agreed to and
signed by the tenant, the said clause is only a hypothetical sentence and does not have a binding
effect. MINSHU 13-366 (Feb. 26, 1934).
139. AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Management Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1995).
140. Id. at 574.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 575.
145. AM Int'l, Inc., 44 F.3d at 575.
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contract to mean what it says (or appears to say) will not suffice"'" to open
doors to extrinsic evidence. The court also said that "only an offer to show
that anyone who understood the context of the contract would realize it
could not mean what an untutored reader would suppose it meant will
suffice."'" Although the parties in this case, unlike the parties in the
previous case, were in the same bargaining position, the rule that self
serving testimony will not suffice to open the doors for introduction of
parol evidence was reinstated. "8
There are two noteworthy cases from the Japanese courts. One is
from the Japanese Supreme Court and the other is from the Fukuoka High
Court. The facts of the Fukuoka High Court case 4 9 were that: X and Y
entered into a supply contract where X was to supply oil in an amount not
exceeding 2,000,000 Yen. The writing in issue provided that "in the
default of the buyer to pay for the petroleum provided, the seller
immediately acquires a right to recover the amount of 2,000,000 Yen."
In other words, the party provided for a liquidated damages clause.
The buyer defaulted on the payment and the seller asserted that
they had a right to recover 2,000,000 Yen pursuant to the written
agreement even though no evidence existed that the petroleum provided
was worth 2,000,000 Yen. The court, however, held that the seller cannot
recover an amount in excess of the value of the petroleum provided for the
buyer.,' The court reasoned that the agreement included a tacit agreement
which upon default, the value of the provided petroleum for the buyer did
not exceed the amount of 2,000,000 Yen.' 2 The buyer would pay the
damages of 2,000,000 Yen, but at the same time would acquire a right to a
146. Id.
147. Judge Posner further states that
[e]ven the strongest devotees of the 'plain meaning' rule of statutory interpretation, a
rule that resembles the 'four corners' rule of contract law, allow it to bend when
necessary to avoid absurd results [citation omitted]. An absurdity in the application of
the plain-meaning rule usually results from a comparison of the apparently plain
meaning to the real-world setting in which the statute is to be applied. It is the same
point that a clear document can be rendered unclear . . . by the way in which it
connects, or fails to connect, with the activities that it regulates.
Id. at 577. He concludes that "[d]iscrepancy between the word and the world is a common
source of interpretive problems everywhere." d. In other words, Judge Posner recognizes the
practicality in bending the rigid rule of interpretation when necessary.
148. Id. at 575.
149. Judgment of May 12, 1960, Fukuoka Kosai, KOMINSHU (Japan).
150. Id. at 263.
151. Id. at 264.
152. Id. at 265.

1996]

Kuzuhara

refund for the excess amount.'" Furthermore, the court found it was
unfair to interpret the agreement as asserted by the seller. '1
Although the Japanese court ignored the explicit language in the
written agreement, it may arrive at the same result in the AM International
case. One of the reasons the court created a new provision, which even
the parties did not agree to, was that the court felt that to require the buyer
to pay that amount of money for what they did not get was inequitable.'
Furthermore, the court felt that the immediate acquisition of a right to
damages by the seller in the event of a default constituted a forfeiture
which the court desired to avoid.'
In the AM International case, on the other hand, the protection of
intellectual property rights may not be enough for the Japanese court to
rewrite the contract.'" After all, in AM International, the holder of the
patent did collect the royalty from the licensee which was close to the full
amount asserted by the licensor.'" To attempt to collect further royalty by
producing only subjective testimony may constitute an abusive use of
rights in the Japanese courts.
Another case is from the Supreme Court of Japan."' The case
involved a mortgage on a land which was foreclosed."'6 The written
agreement provided for a Daibustu-Bensai, but the court held that the
written agreement should be interpreted to mean a Saiken-Tanpo. Again,
the court interpreted the words to create a new legal effect. The court's
intention was probably to prevent forfeiture against the debtor because the
court felt that it was better practice to let the debtor regain his property by
paying off the debt before the auction of the property even though he had
defaulted on the debt.

153. Id. at 267.
154. Id. at 265.
155. Judgment of May 12, 1960, Fukuoka Kosai, Kominshu (Japan).
156. Id.
157. AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Management Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1995).
158. Id. at 574.
159. MINSHU 22-12-2710 (Nov. 19, 1968).
160. Because of the structural differences in the real property law area, the words
nonrecourse and recourse will not be used. For the sake of clarity, the following terms will be
used: Daibustu-Bensai, which is a concept similar to the Anglo-American accord and satisfaction;
Saiken-Tanpo, which is a concept similar to the concept of secured transaction where the creditor
acquires a right to first payment for the full amouit and the rest goes to the secondary creditors.
The simple difference in the two concepts is that in the former situation, the creditor acquires the
property no matter what the value is, and in the latter situation, the creditor acquires the right to
full recovery and not more. MINPO, arts. 377, 378, 482.
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3. Cannon v. Wittek Co. International'6
The facts of this case are as follows: Plaintiff Cannon was hired as
a full-time secretary floater by Wittek Companies International (hereinafter
Wittek) who provided health insurance to its employees through Health
Care Service Corporation, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Plan (hereinafter
Blue Cross). 62 Under the plan, new employees were automatically
enrolled in the insurance plan on the ninety-first day of their employment.
Cannon was separated from her employment in connection with a
reduction in the work force at Wittek, fifty-seven days into her
employment. The personnel transaction sheet read layoff as to Cannon's
type of separation.
Later that year, Cannon was called to return to the job without
filling out any job application form or an insurance form. They were
already filled out at the beginning of her employment. Fifty days after her
return she suffered a heart attack and incurred substantial medical
expenses. By then she had worked for Wittek for one hundred and twelve
non-consecutive days. She learned that Blue Cross was denying her
coverage due to their notion that Cannon was terminated instead of being
laid off and, therefore, her ninety-day waiting period was reinstated at the
time Wittek rehired Cannon.'6 The district court ruled that, in the absence
of any language to the contrary, the ninety days must be consecutive and
could not be tacked.'" As a result, the district court denied Cannon's
6
coverage by Blue Cross.
The issue relevant to this article that was raised on appeal was
whether Wittek was terminated instead of laidoff.'66 This would determine
whether the ninety days could be tacked in order to satisfy the condition to
the payment on the policy. After determining the personnel transaction
sheet was controlling on the issue of termination, the court pointed out the
fact that the sheet indicated that the type of separation was a layoff rather
than a discharge.16 Here again, the employer asserted by self-serving
testimony that even though the personnel transaction sheet indicates a
layoff, Wittek actually meant to terminate Cannon.'" The court rejected
161.
162.
163.
164.

Cannon v. Wittek Co. Int'l, 60 F.3d 1282 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1283.
d.
Id. at 1284.

165. Id.
166. Id. at 1285.
167. Cannon, 60 F.3d at 1285.
168. Id.
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the argument and restated that if an unambiguous contract "can be upended
by the self-serving oral testimony of one party to it that his duty to perform
was actually dependant on a condition nowhere expressed in the contract,
then the parol evidence rule is dead."6
The court finally came to a conclusion that "if Wittek is permitted
to go behind the plain language of the contract with self-serving testimony
about what it really meant when it checked off 'lay-off' on the Personnel
Transaction sheet, then the parol evidence rule would have no force."l70
Accordingly, the court recognized that the parol evidence rule was still
alive and well.
From the preceding cases we still can determine when the court, in
light of all the circumstances, concludes that the introduction of parol
evidence would render unjust results, an a prohibit its introduction.
Circumstances that render unjust results are determined on a case by case
basis, but facts indicating differences in bargaining power, the existence of
an independent tort, and lack of objective evidence that the parties had
agreed on a different meaning, etc., would constitute elements in
determining the admissibility of parol evidence.'"
D. The Japanese Courts' Disposition of the Cases
Certain rules can be extracted from the foregoing analysis of the
cases. The Japanese courts would consider all relevant evidence in
attempting to determine the true intention of the parties. On the other
hand, the American court would first introduce all relevant evidence to
determine whether the written agreement was meant to be the final
agreement. As a practical matter, the result would be the same because
the Japanese courts do not have a jury which could be mislead by the
introduction of parol evidence. The American courts would, at this point,
introduce the parol evidence to the judges only.
Next, the Japanese courts would determine whether the asserted
discrepancy actually existed. The American courts would conduct the
same analysis at this point. They may, however, impose a rule that selfserving testimony would not suffice to render the document ambiguous.
This would allow them to introduce parol evidence to prove the asserted
intention of the party. On the other hand, the Japanese courts would
probably consider the self-serving testimony as evidence in determining the
facts because, as discussed previously, the tradition of the Continental civil
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1282.
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code focuses on the intention of the parties. It can be said, technically,
that self-serving testimony is also relevant in determining the intention of
the parties. Accordingly, discrepancies may exist at this stage.
This difference may not be significant, however, because of the
factual determination by the judge in Japanese courts. Because the distrust
towards the jury does not exist in Japanese courts, the possibility that the
factual determination will be misled decreases substantially. Furthermore,
the Japanese courts may require the proponent of the parol evidence to
show they have relied upon the alleged fact, which was not described in
the written agreement, in order to establish the violation of honesty and
loyalty requirement.'7 If the court finds that the party acted in response to
a fact which was not included in the final written agreement, the other
party will generally be required to perform their obligation."'
V. THE PROPOSED APPROACH IN CONTRACTING BETWEEN A
JAPANESE ENTERPRISE AND AN AMERICAN ENTERPRISE

Having described the differences in the two legal systems, it may
seem that the American law has become more liberal regarding the
introduction of parol evidence, and, therefore, the written contract has no
significance to it. Furthermore, it may seem that because of the
governmental requirements imposed on Japanese enterprises to file every
agreement entered into with a foreign enterprise, a Japanese enterprise
may agree to execute a fully detailed written contract that will exclude any
parol evidence.
Because the Japanese culture prefers avoiding
documentation of agreements, they are still likely to avoid detailed
contracts. For an American business entity it would be safer to assume
that the Japanese will resort to outside evidence when it comes to
performance."'
The first problem the parties must solve is in which language the
contract or the agreement will be drafted. Generally, the Japanese will
understand English more than the Americans will understand Japanese.
This generalization, however, must be studied carefully. The parties must
understand that the language they are using is not ordinary English, but
often legalese English. As previously discussed, words are understood in
conjunction with the surrounding circumstances and the situation in which
172. 3 KITAGAWA, supra note 39, § 1.09(4).
173. In Japan, as in most civil code countries, specific performance is the ordinary remedy
and, unlike in the United States, monetary damages are rare. GILMORE, supra note 21, at 14.
174. "Japanese businesspeople often rely on mutual trust to the exclusion of formal
contracting. They have traditionally viewed the need to contract as a lack of good faith,
potentially injuring future relations .. . ." Salbu, supra note 5, at 1260.

1996]

Kuzuhara

they are used. Accordingly, it may seem impossible to agree on one
meaning of a word that describes a legal effect without knowing the whole
legal system. Even the word contract is understood differently within the
two systems."' Do the parties then have to describe the legal theory
behind every word that they are using? Unfortunately, in order to have a
complete understanding, the answer must be yes. One solution to this
problem is to negotiate with a lawyer or lawyers who have knowledge of
the law in which the document is being drafted. At the same time the
lawyer should be a native speaker, or a very fluent speaker of the language
that is not being used in the contract or the agreement. For example, if the
contract is going to be written in English, the American business entity
must negotiate with a delegate from the Japanese business entity who has
substantial knowledge of the American legal system and the English
language.
The second factor which the parties must concentrate on is the
choice of law clause. This is because the importance of a written
document may be significantly different.
The parties should first
determine whether any disputes which may arise shall be governed by
Japanese law or American law. This choice will determine the whole
mode of the negotiation. Furthermore, that choice will determine what the
final product will look like. If, for example, the parties determine
American contract law will govern the disputes, the written document will
have to include agreement. If the parties fail to insert any clause or
agreement into the final written document, the possibility that the prior
oral or written agreement will be subject to the parol evidence rule will be
significant, and will therefore, be excluded as evidence. Only if the judge
determines that the written document is fully integrated will the rule apply
and will parol evidence be excluded.
On the other hand, if the parties agree that Japanese law will
determine the disputes, it is not necessary to incorporate every single
agreement at which they arrived, although it is a better idea. From a
175. Commentators say that:
[w]hile contract is used in the United States to mean a legally enforceable promise or a
set of promises with accompanying duties and rights, keiyaku (which means "contract"
in Japanese) implies just part of the process of negotiation, namely, the promissory
stage, in which two parties agree to work together to create a mutually advantageous
relationship. The implications of a transaction created by a keiyaku is unclear to
Americans because much of the negotiation and most of the details of the transactions
are intended to be filled in later. . . . [Mlany Japanese negotiators deplore specificity
and verbosity in contracts because they believe that it is like making an arrangement
for divorce when preparing for marriage.
Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 3, at 206.
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practical point of view, however, it is much more convenient for both
parties to include all their agreements in the written document. It will be
easier for reference purposes and more efficient timewise.
The
practitioner or any lawyer who is giving advice to their client must realize
that written documents are not created for the purpose of being submitted
into evidence for trial.
Another notion the practitioner must bear in mind is that even
though the parties orally agreed to choose Japanese law as the governing
law, and thus will be able to introduce this into evidence in a Japanese
court, it is better to insert the choice of law clause in the agreement. This
is because the case may be thrown into an American court despite the fact
the parties orally agreed to choose Japanese law. Eventually, the oral
agreement pertaining to the governing law may be barred by the parol
evidence rule. Similarly, if the parties stipulated to American contract law
as the governing law, but were hailed into a Japanese court, an oral
assertion that Japanese law was agreed to may be admitted into evidence
despite its untruthfulness.
In any event, it is a better idea to insert a choice of law clause
even if it may manifest a hostile attitude towards the other party. The
parties will benefit from that determination by not having to worry about
whether or not the written document will constitute the only reference.
Similarly, choice of forum clauses may be important in the absence of a
choice of law clause because the forum court's law will determine which
law will apply. Although many of these agreements between foreign
business enterprises are submitted to arbitration, some will consider it
more advantageous to go to court. Accordingly, the choice of law clauses
and choice of forum clauses are best included in the agreement.
VI. CONCLUSION

A. The Differences in The Law
So far we have examined the differences between Anglo-American
contract law and Japanese contract law by focusing on the rule concerning
written documents. Furthermore, we have seen that the gap between the
American interpretation of the written document and the Japanese
interpretation of the written document has been narrowed. This is
evidenced by the Uniform Commercial Code's requirement that in every
document a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied, in addition
to a liberation from the rigidity of the parol evidence rule.7 6 A
practitioner, however, still must not underestimate the differences.
176. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1994).
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Part II of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods,171 which the United States of America has signed and approved,
conforms to the Civil Code principles of the freedom from formal
requirements." ' This means that the Statute of Frauds and the Parol
Evidence Rule have no application between signatory countries. Article
96, however, provides that a country whose ordinary practice requires a
written document, may opt out of the requirement.7 9 Since this article is
not concerned with the effect of the choice of law clause, but is concerned
with the way business enterprises negotiate with each other, there will be
no analysis as to what happens when a signatory country and a nonsignatory country enters into a contract. One must emphasize, however,
that the international transaction produces discrepancies in the importance
of a written document.
Accordingly, in the Japan - United States context, the American
practitioner must bear in mind that the Japanese party they are dealing with
is accustomed to simple documents and usually does not require putting
every single agreement in the document. On the other hand, the Japanese
practitioners must bear in mind that the party which they are dealing with
is accustomed to practicing under the Statute of Frauds and should have
some notion of the Parol Evidence Rule in mind.
B. The Differences in The Culture
So far the discussion has focused on the law itself and explains, for
the most part, the differences between the Japanese attitude and the
American attitude towards contracting. One significant aspect, however,
must never be overlooked. The aspect is the differences which stem from
the societal culture. It is not as simple as saying the Japanese appreciate
communitarian values and the Americans will cherish rugged
individualism. In other words, the Japanese are as aggressive as the
Americans and the Americans appreciate the value of community as well
as the Japanese. When the focus is on the society as a whole, however,
each society might have a tendency towards appreciating individualism
over societal values and vice versa.
The long history of the Japanese society's development shows that
the Japanese have always been required to contribute to the society by
sacrificing their individual values. This is true whether we are talking
about the 250 years of seclusion from the rest of the world, or about the
177. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 97/18, Annex 1 (1980).
178. Id.
179. Id. at art. 96.

90

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 3:57

unfortunate war in which the whole world was involved. Expression of
individuality was almost a crime in the pre-World War II era in Japan.
Accordingly, the communitarian values the Japanese are usually associated
with do not come from within the individual, but rather come from the
long history of compelled totalitarianism.
What emerged from this communitarianism are certain norms
which only those in the community understood. These norms are peculiar
to a society which has secluded itself from the rest of the world for a long
time. Unlike a country similar to the United States of America, where
diversity of the citizens is one of the most powerful elements of the
country, Japan derives its power from the homogeneity of the society. In
other words, the Japanese are not required to fully debate an issue in order
to reach a conclusion because the values the society appreciates and the
values the individuals are supposed to appreciate are often the same. On
the other hand, the American way is to give full credit to any minority
opinion. Accordingly, the society must fully debate an issue in order to
reach a conclusion because one value is rather alien to another. As a
result, Americans tend to debate every aspect of an issue in order to reach
a truly democratic conclusion.
One fact the Japanese society must realize is that they are no
longer living in a homogenetic society. The fact their products and
services are flowing into the United States and all over the world, and the
fact that most of the foods which reach Japanese children's mouths are
imported from around the world, requires them to realize they are living in
a truly international society. Accordingly, the values and the attitude
which would only be appreciated in a homogenetic society must be
abandoned, at least in a business setting including a foreign enterprise.
The adherence to a totalitarian character, i.e. resorting to norms that only
the insiders would understand, would only make the misunderstandings
worse. On the other hand, Americans must realize that this historical
character which has been around for more than a thousand years would not
be easily abandoned even if they tried. Thinking that the slow process of
's
negotiating by the Japanese is only strategic misses the whole point. w
Americans must understand the long tradition of this character.

180. Some commentators say that the Japanese use the technique of pretending not to
understand English or say that they have to ask their superiors in order to take time and come up
with the best solution. The negotiation styles of Japanese are discussed in Zhang & Kuroda,
supra note 3. Furthermore, a rather patriotic article may be Walters, supra note 2. This title,
Now That I Ate The Sushi, Do We Have a Deal? is highly offensive, and as long as these
inadvertent (or is it intentional?) expressions are used, the road to harmony between the two
societies will be very long.
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In conclusion, what can be and should be required from both
parties is that they should communicate the ambiguity to.the other party
when they are not sure of a certain aspect of the agreement, whether they
put it in writing or not. This can be described as the requirement of
presentation. In the United States, more and more cases recognize the
requirement of presentation,'"' and hold the party who takes advantage of
the other's lack of knowledge in breach of an implied covenant of good
dealing and fair play." This seems to be the American counterpart of the
Japanese honesty and loyalty requirement. Finally, the parties must not
forget that the Uniform Commercial Code and article I of the Japanese
Civil Code both require the notion of goodfaith, fair dealing, honesty, and
loyalty. Although the precise usage of the words are different, they mean
absolutely the same thing.

181 See generally LINZER, supra note 85.
182. Id.

